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A TWO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF ISRAEL’S STRATEGY
TOWARD PEACE DURING THE 1990S
Shlomo Mizrahi, Abraham Mehrez, Arye Naor
Abstract
This paper suggests a two-level game analysis of Israel’s strategy toward peace
during the 1990s. The paper shows how various paradoxes in Israeli society create
domestic obstacles and internal opposition that weaken Israel’s bargaining position
toward neighboring countries. Treating domestic parameters in these countries as a
given, we argue that Israeli leaders can hardly use this weakness to manipulate
information in the bargaining process, because neighboring countries can observe
Israel’s internal processes. Therefore, attempts by Israeli leaders to create the
impression that they are willing to adopt a conflictual approach towards neighboring
polities, especially the Palestinians, without actually creating the necessary internal
conditions for such a policy, may finally lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium for Israel –
in terms of territory and deterrent ability – since it will have to compromise under
difficult conditions. Several practical implications as to the preferred bargaining
process under these conditions follow.
Introduction
During his service as Secretary of State in the 1970s, Henry Kissinger once
stated that Israel did not have a foreign policy, it had only domestic policy. By that he
meant that Israel’s foreign policy is primarily the result of internal conditions and
constraints. Yet since this claim was made, students of Israel’s foreign and strategic
policy, especially within the discipline of international relations, have not dealt with
this issue systematically. Most studies focus on the balance of power between Israel
and the neighboring countries as measured by armed forces, territory and security
budget (Karsh and Mahler, 1994). Kissinger’s observation seems more correct than
ever in the 1990s, however, in light of events since the signing of the Oslo Agreement.
This observation was reaffirmed recently, in May 2000, when Israel unilaterally
withdrew from Lebanon. The withdrawal followed strong internal pressures that were
interpreted by many as a significant decline in the willingness of the Israeli public to
pay the price of conflict. Indeed, Sheik Nassralla, the leader of the Southern Lebanese
guerrilla organization Hizbullah, called on the Palestinians to observe how weak Israel
had become despite its military strength.
This paper analyzes the impact of internal socio-political and economic processes
in Israel on its strategic position in the Middle East, and especially its peace strategy
during the 1990s. We assume that Israel is facing a bloc of hostile countries composed
of players such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and parts of Palestinian society. The interests
Peace and Conflict Studies Journal, Volume 8, Number 1, May 2001

44

Israel's Strategy toward Peace

of these players may differ in certain aspects, and they do not necessarily coordinate
their strategy towards Israel. We assume, however, that their basic calculations
concerning Israel are similar, and therefore concentrate on domestic variables that
influence Israel’s strategic choices while treating domestic parameters in the hostile
bloc as a given.
The paper uses the general concept of “nested games,” where players’ interests
and actions in one game are influenced by their involvement in others (Tsebelis, 1990;
Colomer, 1995). Specifically, the paper applies the idea of a two-level game, as
developed for analyzing international relations and foreign policy (Schelling, 1960;
Putnam, 1988; Iida, 1993; Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993; Schneider and
Cederman, 1994; Mo, 1995; Schultz, 1998). Two-level game literature has introduced
solid micro foundations to the theory of international bargaining. Most importantly, this
research tradition has shown that the amount of uncertainty in the international system
is not a given but can be manipulated both for the better and for the worse. This
ambiguous potential is the essence of a two-level dilemma in world politics in which
domestic politics affects international behavior both positively and negatively, and vice
versa – clearly, international conditions also affect domestic politics, which again
affects foreign policy. To avoid a cyclical argument, we concentrate on explaining
foreign policy based on internal conditions. The opposite direction of this mutual
dependency between foreign and domestic policy will be discussed only when
necessary.
A major debate in the literature is whether domestic obstacles weaken or
strengthen the state’s bargaining position in international negotiations. Putnam (1988)
has shown how negotiators might claim successfully that domestic opposition prevents
them from concurring in an international agreement. Iida (1993) questions this
argument and relies on sequential bargaining to analyze how domestic constraints
impact the negotiations between two states, given various assumptions regarding
information. One basic result is that a country’s bargaining leverage does not
necessarily increase when its domestic constraints become more severe. When there is
complete information about domestic constraints, the constrained negotiator has a
bargaining advantage only if the constraints are severe. When there is asymmetric
international information, the constrained negotiator will benefit only if the foreign
negotiator strongly believes that the home negotiator is severely constrained. Finally,
Iida (1993) shows that when there is incomplete domestic information (on the side of
the home negotiator), the constrained negotiator has a bargaining advantage if the
probability of successful ratification increases with the share that this side receives.
This opens up the possibility for misinterpretation, which may lead to efficiency loss.
On the other hand, Schultz (1998) shows that as there is more domestic competition in
a state (e.g., in democratic regimes), the ex ante probability of war decreases, since a
strategic opposition party helps reveal information about the state’s preferences. In this
paper, we argue that the Schultz model is more accurate than the Iida model for
analyzing the interaction between Israel and the neighboring countries. Given Israel’s
democratic regime, neighboring countries can easily obtain information about Israel’s
internal processes.
Empirical studies also question Putnam’s argument. According to Evans et al
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(1993: 409), leaders “did try to strategically misinterpret their own politics, but not as
often as expected, and with much less success.” In Moravscik’s view (1993: 159),
bluffing is rare because governments might be able to predict the actions of an eventual
cheater: “…among modern information-rich democracies, it is extremely difficult for
negotiators to mask their true domestic win-set, even in a sensitive area of national
security like weapons procurement.” In other words, as the clarity of a state’s domestic
obstacles increases, the ability of the state’s leaders to manipulate this information in
the bargaining process declines. Such clarity is more likely in democracies, but in many
cases it also exists in non-democratic systems.
With regard to Israel’s strategic choices and foreign policy in the Middle East
during the 1990s, this paper shows how domestic obstacles and internal opposition
weaken Israel’s bargaining position towards the hostile bloc it faces. We also argue that
using this weakness to manipulate information is unlikely to be advantageous, because
of the characteristics of two-level interaction, as mentioned above.
During the 1990s Israel faced several challenges – especially the Gulf War in
1991 and the armament of states like Syria and Iran – which threatened to upset the
balance of power between it and several neighboring countries that comprise a hostile
bloc. Those events, as well as the Palestinian uprising (“Intifada”) since 1987, led
Israeli leaders to devise a peace policy that found expression in the Oslo Agreement
signed in September 1993 (Peres and Naor, 1993). However, due to internal opposition
within both Israeli and Palestinian societies, the peace process, which brought great
hope to the region, gradually slowed down. Moslem and Jewish fundamentalists
committed terrorist attacks on civilian populations. The Israeli Prime Minister who
made peace, Yitzhak Rabin, was murdered at a political rally by a Jewish extremist,
and Palestinian suicide bombers took the lives of many Israelis. Thus, the public mood
was more open to the right-wing campaign that brought Benjamin Netanyahu to power
in 1996. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “The air of
optimism generated by the famous Rabin-Arafat handshake on the lawn of the White
House in September 1993, dissipated long ago… official Israeli statements refer to the
process as going through a critical stage. The Secretary-General of the Palestinian
Cabinet, Ahmed Abdel Rahman, has gone much further. In March 1998, he announced
the death of the peace process.” (IISS, 1998: 144).
The shift in Israel’s approach to the peace process cannot be attributed solely to
the fact that a right-wing government governed Israel from May 1996 to May 1999. We
argue, rather, that it is not only ideological considerations that explain the slow-down
of the peace process but also several paradoxes within Israeli society. Since the
Palestinians, as well as other Arab countries, observe these processes, Israeli leaders
are hardly able to use domestic obstacles to manipulate information in the bargaining
process, as might be theorized according to Schelling (1960: 22) and Putnam (1988).
Therefore, a precondition for an Israeli leader to halt the peace process for any reason
and take a conflictual approach toward the hostile bloc is to shape the preferences of
Israeli society. This includes convincing the different population segments that Israel is
playing a non-cooperative game with its neighbors – especially the Palestinians – and
creating a willingness to tolerate the high cost of violent conflict. We show, however,
that the deepening polarization of Israeli society in various dimensions makes it very
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hard to create such beliefs. Therefore, attempts by Israeli leaders to create the
impression that they are willing to adopt a conflictual approach towards the hostile
bloc, without actually creating the necessary internal conditions for such policy, may
finally lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium for Israel – in terms of territory and deterrence
ability – since it will have to compromise under difficult conditions. Once Israeli
leaders understand these limitations, it is highly probable that they will form a peace
strategy that takes into account the different interests and sensitivities of the
neighboring states. Further, the analysis suggests that a consensus in Israeli society may
be achieved if there is a sequential bargaining process on crucial issues, with decisions
on each issue being taken one at a time, followed by implementation and evaluation of
outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section uses games in presenting
the development of power relations and equilibria in the Middle East until the 1990s.
The next section discusses domestic conditions that influence Israel’s strategic choices,
as well as its peace policy. Subsequently, we model and explain the possible impact of
those domestic conditions on Israel’s strategy toward the peace process with the
Palestinians.
The Development of Power Relations in the Middle East
The main characteristic of the relations between Israel and neighboring countries
has been that these countries did not recognize Israel’s right to exist as an independent
state. Until 1977 this was the position of all Arab countries; since then several states –
Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, and some Persian Gulf states – have joined the peace
process to some extent. Hostile countries, however, such as Syria, Libya, Iran, and Iraq,
still do not recognize Israel’s right to exist. As for the Israeli side, it has recognized all
Arab states, other than the Palestinians’ right to an independent state. Moreover, until
1967 the conflict was not about “the occupied territories” but concerned, rather, most
of the area of Israel as one large occupied territory. The minimal demand was for Israel
to give up territories it occupied in the 1948 Independence War and to allow the return
of Palestinian refugees. The maximal demand, of course, was the abolition of Israel as
an independent state. As a result, the Israeli national security conception has been
defensive at the strategic level and offensive at the operative level (Horowitz, 1975).
The defensive approach at the strategic level has relied on conventional and nonconventional deterrence, motivating a reciprocal arms race between Israel and its
neighbors (Aronson, 1984).
Given the existential nature of the conflict until the early 1970s, the power
relations between the Arab countries and Israel during that period can be best described
as a zero-sum game. First, we will illustrate this argument by specifying the
preferences of Israel and its neighbors, excluding the Palestinians, until the mid-1970s.
Then we will explain how, since the mid-1970s, the game between Israel and some
neighboring countries has been transformed into a symmetrical prisoners’ dilemma (see
also: Brams, 1994: 85-7, 101-2). Finally, we suggest a game for analyzing the power
relations between Israel and the Palestinians.
In the first stage, the players – Israel (I) and a given neighboring country (N) – are
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modeled as unitary players, i.e., they are assumed to be homogeneous societies. In this
game each side has two strategies. Israel can cooperate (C) with the neighboring
country by signing a peace treaty which satisfies the neighboring country's territorial
(or other) demands to some extent, or not cooperate (D), meaning that it does not give
up any territory but has to invest in building deterrent ability. The neighboring country
can cooperate (C) with Israel by recognizing its legitimacy to exist and signing a peace
treaty, or not cooperate (D), meaning that it does not recognize Israel and has to invest
in the arms race. The combination of these strategies creates four possible outcomes:
C-C: Both sides cooperate.
D-C: Israel does not cooperate while the neighboring country cooperates.
C-D: Israel cooperates while the neighboring country does not cooperate.
D-D: Neither side cooperates.
The players’ preferences for these outcomes are as follows: Israel mostly prefers
D-C, because then it benefits from the neighboring country’s cooperation without
giving up any territory (α). Israel’s least preferred outcome is C-D, because then it
gives up territory without benefiting (δ). It pays a price both in terms of territory and by
further investment in building deterrent ability. Israel prefers mutual cooperation (β),
C-C, to mutual defection (γ), D-D, because then it can attain peace for its citizens and
reduce the cost of an arms buildup. The underlying assumption is that Israel recognizes
the benefits of peace even at the cost of territorial compromise. As will be shown later,
if this is not the case for both sides, the conflict is even deeper than that described by a
zero-sum game or by the prisoners’ dilemma. Israel’s order of preferences is:
α = (D,C) > β= (C,C) > γ= (D,D) > δ = (C,D)
The neighboring country has calculations similar to those of Israel for D-C and CD. Yet, as explained, until the mid-1970s the neighboring countries did not recognize
Israel’s legitimacy to exist and therefore preferred mutual defection to mutual
cooperation. That is, the neighboring country in this game did not believe it could attain
any benefits from mutual cooperation while it could benefit from escalating the
conflict. It follows that the neighboring country prefers D-D to C-C; thus, its order of
preference is:
α = (C,D) > β= (D,D) > γ = (C,C) > δ= (D,C)
Figure 1: A Zero-Sum Game between Israel and a Hostile Neighboring Country

C

Hostile Bloc
C
D
β, γ
δ, α

D

α, δ

Israel
γ, β

The players’ order of preference is presented in a game matrix in Figure 1 where
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α>β>γ>δ. This is a zero-sum game where one player’s win is the other’s loss.
Technically, if the order is presented in terms of numbers, e.g., 1,2,3,4, the sum in each
cell is the same. In this game, both players have a dominant strategy of non-cooperation
(D) leading to the unique Nash equilibrium (γ, β). This means that in a situation of
conflict the neighboring country is better off than Israel since it does not recognize any
benefits from cooperation.
It follows that any change in the equilibrium outcome, which existed until the
mid-1970s, required a preference change by the neighboring country. The change came
about due to certain changes in attitude after the Yom Kippur war of October 1973
(Stein, 1985). This and other processes we will not discuss here changed the attitudes
of some neighboring countries about cooperation (Mansur, 1985). They began
recognizing the advantages of mutual cooperation, meaning that the zero-sum game
presented in Figure 1 was transformed into the symmetrical prisoners’ dilemma
presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2: A Symmetric Prisoners’ Dilemma between Israel and a Neighboring Country
Neighboring Country
C
D
C
β, β
δ, α
Israel
D

α, δ

γ, γ

In this game, neither Israel nor the neighboring country is motivated to begin
cooperating on its own. Therefore, both sides stay with their dominant strategy of noncooperation and the equilibrium remains very stable. It is commonly argued that the
players can reach a Pareto-optimal outcome (β, β) when a third party intervenes and
creates incentives for (or forces) cooperation.
Third party intervention is usually discussed in the literature with respect to
intrastate, often ethnic, conflicts (Licklider, 1993; Gurr, 1993; Gottlieb, 1993). Walter
(1997), for example, studied 41 civil wars between 1940 and 1990, and showed the
importance of third-party intervention in finding successful negotiated solutions. She
argues that negotiated settlements do not fail because bargains cannot be struck but,
rather, because it is almost impossible for the combatants themselves to arrange
credible guarantees on the terms of the settlement. Regan (1996) also studied all
intrastate conflicts since 1944, showing that it is the characteristics of the intervention
strategy rather than the characteristics of the conflict that largely determine the success
of the intervention. Thus, third-party intervention is required both to create incentives
for cooperation and to guarantee the terms of compromise.
Indeed, under the new circumstances created by the 1973 war, the intervention of
a third party became possible and American mediation led to the first peace treaty in
the Middle East – between Israel and Egypt. In that peace process both incentives and
guarantees were needed.
To complete the analysis of the historical conditions, we now suggest a game to
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describe the power relations between Israel and the Palestinians until the early 1990s.
As explained, in that period neither Israel nor the Palestinians recognized the other’s
right to form an independent state. Therefore, the essence of the conflict was
existential, meaning that neither side recognized the advantages of mutual cooperation.
The order of preferences that corresponds to this situation is that of the neighboring
country in Figure 1. If neither side recognizes the advantages of mutual cooperation,
the D-D outcome is preferred to the C-C one.
Figure 3: The Power Relations between Israel and the Palestinians when Both Sides
Do Not Recognize the Advantages of Mutual Cooperation

C

Palestinians
C
D
γ, γ
δ, α

D

α, δ

Israel
β, β

Figure 3 shows that, under the above-mentioned condition, not only is there a
dominant strategy of non-cooperation for both sides but also the Nash equilibrium is
Pareto-optimal (β, β). In other words, both sides believe they win something in a D-D
situation while they would only lose in a C-C situation. This means that even if there is
a third party who wants to force an agreement, it will have to invest a lot of resources,
because the cost of mutual cooperation is higher than the cost of mutual noncooperation. In comparison, in the prisoners’ dilemma the choice of D-D is due to Nash
equilibrium calculations leading to a situation of mutually hurting stalemate situation
(Zartman, 1991). In such a case, a third party’s intervention can evidently help the sides
achieve cooperation.
This equilibrium analysis does not refer to domestic variables because until the
mid-1970s Israeli society and political culture were uni-dimensional on the security
issue (Arian, 1985; Barzilai, 1996; Sened, 1996). Internal conflicts were covered by
the belief that it was necessary to defend the country, as long as the Labor party
governed Israel, from 1948 to 1977. This homogeneous political culture began to
change in 1977 when the Likud party formed a coalition for the first time. This
electoral change expressed and triggered the polarization of Israeli society in several
aspects. As a result, Israel’s strategic choices and calculations in its relations with
neighboring countries have been transformed.
Internal Processes Influencing Israel’s Strategy toward Peace in the Late 1990s
The socio-political and economic processes during 1977-1998 highlight five
dimensions that influence Israel’s power and strategic choices in the international
scene: The socio-economic dimension, the ethnic-religious dimension, the geographical
dimension in terms of center-periphery relations, the security dimension in light of the
Arab-Israel conflict, and the dimension of arms buildup, both conventional and non-
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conventional. In this section, we describe the polarization in each dimension and the
mutual dependence between them. According to opinion polls, 30% of the JewishIsraeli population regard the increased internal tension among various segments of the
people as the most important problem on Israel’s public agenda, and 31% so regard the
slowdown in the economy, while only 19% regard the stalemate in the peace process as
the most important problem facing Israel (Ya’ar and Hermann, 1998). Since the
polarization in the various dimensions merge with each other, any Israeli government
potentially faces significant domestic difficulties in building a consensus around a
foreign policy.
The Socio-Economic Dimension: Traditionally the Israeli economy has been
characterized as highly centralized due to the socialist political culture (Horowitz and
Lissak, 1989). The 1990s, however, have been characterized by privatization processes,
with various social and economic consequences. These processes include market
liberalization, deregulation, transfer of control and management to stockholders, and
attempts by international companies to enter the Israeli market (Office for Economic
Planning’s Report, 1994). Another aspect of these processes is the creation of
flexibility and mobilization in the labor force, thus intensifying socio-economic
inequality. Further, due to security problems during the Palestinian uprising
(“Intifada”), the Israeli economy became dependent on cheap imported labor to replace
cheap Palestinian workers. The large number of imported workers from Africa, SouthEast Asia and Eastern Europe created significant social, demographic and moral
problems due to their very low wages, inequality and lack of basic social and labor
rights (Kondor, 1997). This labor policy, which was encouraged by the government,
also created significant difficulties for the Palestinian economy, which was highly
dependent on the Israeli economy (Roy, 1995).
The growing socio-economic gaps together with rising unemployment became one
of the main issues dividing Israeli society, creating a potential for conflict. Further,
when the polarization of this dimension merges with polarization in other dimensions,
the potential for conflict intensifies. This leads us to the second dimension listed above.
The Ethnic-Religious Dimension: Israeli society is made up of Jewish immigrants
from many countries. From the 1920s to the 1940s, these immigrants came mainly
from Europe, thus creating a predominantly Western-oriented culture (Horowitz and
Lissak, 1989). During the 1950s, after the establishment of the State of Israel, there was
large-scale immigration from Arab and Muslim states, thus changing the proportion
between the Western-oriented population segment, usually termed “Ashkenazi” and the
Eastern-oriented population segment, usually termed “Sephardi.” The arrival of
Sephardim in a predominantly Western-oriented culture created many difficulties for
them in becoming established (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989:117). Over the long term,
this ethnic division merged with the socio-economic polarization: The lower classes
were mostly composed of Sephardim, and this intensified their feelings of
discrimination and deprivation.
Furthermore, many Sephardim were religiously observant, and thus the orthodoxsecular polarization in Israeli society also merged with the previous two (Liebman,
1997; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989). On the other hand, national-religious Ashkenazim
also share the popular feeling of traditional Sephardim against the individualism that
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characterizes the willingness to negotiate with the Palestinians and to recognize the
PLO. In the previous decade, Israel (together with Portugal) had been excluded from
Western individualism, on the grounds of its collectivist culture (Hofstede, 1983;
Huntington, 1996: 71). As Liebman (1997: 102-103) notes, in the current era of
growing individualist ethos, religious Zionists are the sector most committed to the
values of Israel’s civil religion. The religious import of their political and cultural
approach gives it a sense of holiness that separates religiously orthodox people from
the rest of society. The merging of polarization in the two dimensions discussed so far
(i.e., the socio-economic and the ethnic-religious dimensions) intensifies the conflicts
between these population segments. It also presents great difficulty in terms of
mobilizing the entire society for a given cause, because the bonds that maintained a
certain national consensus until 1977 no longer exist. The polarization in other
dimensions further intensifies the problem.
The Geographical Dimension of Center-Periphery Relations: Interestingly
enough, polarization in the geographical dimension also fits the other aspects discussed
thus far. Many new immigrants to Israel during the 1950s were sent to the periphery,
especially to development towns in the south and north of Israel, while the political,
economic and geographical centers (i.e., Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem) were dominated by
the upper and middle classes (Arian, 1985; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Lipshitz, 1996;
Waterman, 1996). As a result, the periphery is dominated by traditional and religious,
lower-class Sephardim. It follows that the geographical division of Israeli society also
fits the other aspects of polarization and inferiority, as well as their political
consequences.
The Security Dimension relative to the Arab-Israeli Conflict: This dimension has
been dominant in Israeli society for most of the century (Arian, 1985; Arian and
Shamir, 1990; Barzilai, 1996; Sened, 1996). The question of territorial compromise in
exchange for peace has been at the center of political debate since the beginning of
Zionism. Other questions, such as Israeli-Jewish identity, usually merged into this
dimension. In this respect, until 1977 there was a national consensus on the policy
adopted by the Labor-led government (Arian and Shamir, 1990). However, the sociopolitical and economic processes discussed so far also influenced this dimension. Since
the early 1980s – especially since the 1982 Israeli-Palestinian war in Lebanon – the
polarization between right and left in Israeli society intensified (Arian and Shamir,
1990; 1994; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989).
To a large extent this polarization fits the divisions in the other dimensions –
lower-class voters, the Sephardim, voters in the periphery, and religious voters
traditionally support right-wing parties (Yuchtman-Yaar and Hermann, 1998; Shamir
and Arian, 1999). Shamir and Arian (1999) present a logistic regression based on a
longitudinal analysis of electoral cleavages from 1969 to 1996, and an analysis of the
1996 election. They show that religious, Sephardim, less educated, and lower status
workers voted for the right-wing Likud and religious parties, whereas the left (Labor
and Meretz) has had a disproportionate share of secular, upper class Ashkenazi voters.
Since voting patterns significantly correlate with the preferences concerning the peace
process, this cross-sectional characterization fits the polarization in the security
dimension. This argument is also supported by an ongoing monthly opinion poll done
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by Yaar and Hermann (1993-2000), beginning in August 1993. These polls, also called
the peace index, basically examine the public’s attitudes toward the peace process
given ongoing events and the divisions in Israeli society. As explained earlier, the
range of alternatives in Israel’s policy toward neighboring countries is ultimately
reduced to a dichotomous choice: A person is either for or against giving up territory in
exchange for peace. This distinction is the basis for the poll questions. The participants
sampled are representative of the Jewish population of Israel. According to this
continuing opinion poll, the religious population in general, and the Ultra-Orthodox in
particular, has assumed the role of the radical right-wing symbol for everything
touching on the peace process (Ya’ar and Hermann, 1997a). Among the UltraOrthodox only 20.5% support or greatly support the process; among those defining
themselves as Religious 43% support the process. On the other hand, 82% of
traditionalist and 78% of secular groups declared their support for the process (Ya’ar
and Hermann, 1997b).
Thus, low-class voters, Sephardim, peripheral voters and religious voters
traditionally support right-wing parties. Although some of these voters do not
completely accept the right-wing attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict, they vote for
right-wing parties based on their calculations and preferences in the other dimensions
(Arian and Shamir, 1990; 1994). As a result, Israeli society faces the paradox that a
small majority of the population favors the peace process, but this is not clearly
expressed in the political division of power.
Table 1 shows there is long-standing support for the peace process, but
Netanyahu still won the May 1996 election even though he challenged the peace policy
of his predecessors, Rabin and Peres. It was only in the May 1999 election that the leftwing candidate, Barak, took over from Netanyahu, and that supporters of the peace
process received nearly 50% of the seats in the parliament. Thus, since May 1999 the
near-50% support for the peace process has been expressed in the political division of
power.
Table 1 also shows certain changes in the support for the peace process over the
months. Although these changes are not statistically significant, they are usually
attributed to events and developments in the peace process. For example, violent
attacks by the Palestinians in the territories or by Hizbullah in Lebanon are clearly
followed by declining support for the peace process. Thus, the two-level dynamic also
works in the opposite direction. Not only do internal processes influence foreign policy
but international events and developments also influence internal beliefs and processes.
It is often argued, for example, that the slowdown in the peace process during 1994-95
can be attributed to the murderous car bombs exploded by extreme Palestinians, which
killed many Israelis.
It follows that the deep polarization in the socio-economic, ethnic-religious and
geographical dimensions project strongly onto the security dimension, thus creating
great domestic difficulty for any peace policy. Furthermore, the deep polarization
between different social segments creates domestic difficulties for any foreign policy,
because Israel’s leaders cannot create a consensus for a militarist policy either. As
expressed through their behavior during the Gulf War and the long-standing conflict in
Lebanon and the occupied territories, many of Israel’s citizens are no longer willing to
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pay the high price of a non-consensual war (Barzilai, 1996; Ya’ar and Hermann, 1998).
This approach also affects the fifth dimension mentioned above – arms buildup, both
conventional and non-conventional.

Table 1: The Level of Support in the Peace Process with the Palestinians among
the Jewish-Israeli Population – August 1993-April 2000
Time

In favor
(percent)

Time

In favor
(percent)

August 1993

53

June 1997

50.2

June 1994

51

September 1997

45.9

December 1994

47.4

December 1997

49.4

March 1995

48.5

March 1998

50.9

September 1995

45.3

September 1998

47.2

December 1995

55.8

December 1998

52.2

March 1996

50.5

April 1999

56.8

June 1996

48.4

August 1999

47.8

September 1996

50

November 1999

51.7

December 1996

54.5

April 2000

47.9

March 1997

48

August 2000

45.3

Source: Yaar and Hermann (1993-2000)
The Dimension of Non-conventional Deterrence: For many years Israel
maintained a policy of obscuring its nuclear capability, by stating it would not be the
first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East (Aronson, 1992).
Nevertheless, it became common belief that Israel had an impressive nuclear
endowment. Based on his impressions from Egyptian leaders, Peres attributed Egypt’s
decision to make peace with Israel to that capability, in part (Peres and Naor, 1993: 45). It did not, however, prevent Egypt from launching a limited war against Israel four
years earlier. According to some accounts, in 1973 Israel already had nuclear arms,
which could be deployed from aircraft and missiles (Hersh, 1991: 215-6; Paul, 1995).
Israeli deterrent calculations were based on the possession of superior conventional and
nuclear capability, and the Israeli leadership implicitly declared this capability to be its
ultimate deterrent against an Arab attack: Before the October 1973 war, leaders such
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as Defense Minister Moshe Dayan hinted at the Israeli nuclear deterrent and made
ambiguous nuclear threats (Evron, 1990; Bar-Joseph, 1982; Feldman, 1982; Freedman,
1975). Dayan reportedly believed that the Arab states would not initiate a war before
the early 1980s, and until then Israel’s nuclear capability likely would act as a deterrent
against conventional attack. From 1967 to 1973, the Arab leaders and the media talked
unceasingly of Israeli nuclear capability and the implications of it (Van Creveld, 1993:
108-110; Evron, 1973: 19-31). The Egyptians were also presumed to have received
intelligence information on Israel’s nuclear weapons and strategy from Soviet spies
who had penetrated the state’s defense and intelligence establishments (Hersh, 1991:
219).
However, non-conventional deterrence capability did not deter Egypt and Syria
from starting a conventional war in October 1973. Stein (1985) suggests that Egyptian
internal politics were much more important than Israel’s conventional or nonconventional strength. Paul (1995), on the other hand, attributes this and other similar
cases to the concept of “nuclear taboo,” the notion that nuclear weapons are
characterized by their non-use. As Schelling (1994: 110) argues, the main reason for
the uniqueness of nuclear weapons is the perception that they are unique and that once
introduced into combat, they cannot be “contained, restrained, confined, or limited.”
Given this “nuclear taboo,” Israel’s nuclear ability cannot guarantee that a limited war
will not break out. Therefore, the influence of Israeli society’s deep polarizations on its
willingness to enter into a conventional war is a central parameter in analyzing the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
These polarizations, which cannot be hidden from neighboring countries, is a
source of weakness for Israel’s position in the region. Israel’s leaders can indeed claim,
as they often have, that they cannot proceed with the peace process due to internal
opposition. But neighboring countries can also observe the strong opposition to a nonconsensual war. Domestic obstacles, therefore, can hardly be used to manipulate
information in the bargaining process. We now discuss the effect of these obstacles on
the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
Israel’s Strategic Choices Relative to the Peace Process with
the Palestinians in the Late 1990s
In this section, we analyze Israel’s strategic choices with regard to the peace
process with the Palestinians in the late 1990s. Given the two-level game approach, we
first explain the preferences of the two sides as they have been shaped until the late
1990s. Based on these preferences, we outline the basic strategic choices open to Israeli
leaders. We then expand the analysis to explain the bargaining mechanism preferred for
Israel.
Applying the two-level game to the Palestinians, their position was influenced by
international events such as the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent
loss of superpower support by Syria and other Arab states, as well as the Palestinians’
own loss of support from the Gulf States following the 1991 war with Iraq. These
events created the basic conditions for the Palestinians to move toward a cooperative
strategy as expressed by the signing of the Oslo Agreement (Zartman, 1997).
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Yet, since the signing of the Oslo Agreement, dissatisfaction with the IsraeliPalestinian peace process has grown significantly among the Palestinian population
(IISS, 1998: 146-148). As expressed in the Palestinians’ own observations, the
economic situation in their autonomous regions deteriorated (Roy, 1995) and the Israeli
government’s new policy since May 1996 has left the impression that their demands
will not be met soon enough. As one military officer said, “When people are hungry,
policy disintegrates” (Limor, 1998). As a result, they hardly trust Israel’s promises and
commitments. This change in attitude, which mainly took place during 1996-1998,
means that the Palestinians’ order of preference in the prisoners’ dilemma is as
presented in Figure 2. They recognize the advantages of cooperation but believe they
are playing a non-cooperative game with Israel, meaning that they prefer conflict (D-D)
to the option of being the sole compromiser (D-C).
Because of the internal polarization discussed earlier, however, Israel has a
different order of preference in its game with the Palestinians. This polarization means
that Israeli society is divided in respect to the peace process. A significant right-wing
segment of society actually views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of the
prisoners’ dilemma described in Figure 2. Among them is a small “farther right” group
of Israelis who, in line with the Figure 3 game, genuinely prefer mutual conflict with
the Arabs to mutual cooperation. On the other hand, supporters of the peace process are
more inclined toward cooperation with the Palestinians and clearly are not willing to
pay the price of what they regard “a non-consensual war”. This means that their order
of preference is similar to that in the Chicken game, where conflict is the worst
outcome (Taylor, 1987). In a symmetrical Chicken game, there are two equilibria in
pure strategies: A player will cooperate if he/she believes the other will not cooperate,
but will not cooperate if he/she believes the other will.
It follows that, given domestic conditions, Israeli leaders can adopt neither a
conflictual approach toward the Palestinians nor a coherent peace strategy. All they can
know with certainty is that a majority of the population supports some version of
compromise, and that to those in favor of the peace process a violent conflict with the
Palestinians constitutes the highest cost and therefore may also deepen the polarization,
towards a total disintegration of Israeli society. On the other hand, right-wing parties
and their supporters are split. Since most of them understand that the Oslo Agreement
is irreversible (Sprinzak, 1998), they are willing to make some compromises, meaning
that mutual cooperation is preferred to mutual defection. Thus, for them as well a
violent conflict is ordered low in their preferences, while a reasonable compromise in
their view can be accepted. This approach is expressed, for example, in the relatively
low mass mobilization against compromises made by Netanyahu and Barak. In
addition, in the May 1999 elections right-wing parties which strongly opposed any
compromise in the peace process lost many seats in the parliament, and they now
constitute only 7-10% of the seats. Overall, the hard core of strong opposition to the
peace process is composed of religious settlers numbering about 50 thousand people.
Although they constitute a strong interest group, they have gradually understood their
power is limited. Furthermore, following the assassination of Itzhak Rabin in 1995 their
modes of protest have modified significantly, and the intensity of their protest activities
has declined (Yuchtman-Yaar and Hermann, 1998a). This opposition may also use
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party tactical/electoral/coalition calculations to bring about the government’s
disintegration following a given move in the peace process. But these are stages in the
adaptation of public attitudes to peace and of the division of political power in the
parliament. Based on these indications, we argue that a clear majority of Israeli public
and politicians recognize the need for compromises in negotiating with the Palestinians.
This means that the long-term potential for societal disintegration as a result of
concessions is lower than the disintegration potential as a result of conflict.
Thus, it is almost impossible to create a consensus for a conflictual strategy
toward the Palestinians, while a reasonable consensus can be achieved over certain
concessions. Therefore, the option of violent conflict is the worst possible outcome for
Israeli leaders in their relations with the Palestinians. As explained in the previous
section, the polarization in all dimensions converges; as a result politicians and
observers have difficulty isolating the attitudes and motivations in each dimension
separately. Yet, both Israeli and Palestinian leaders clearly observe the unwillingness of
the Israeli public to pay the high price of violent conflict. They can both interpret the
preference ordering of Israeli leaders as being similar to that of the Chicken game.
Hence, due to domestic obstacles, Israeli leaders’ order of preference in their game
with the Palestinians can be represented as follows:
α = (D,C) > β = (C,C) > γ = (C,D) > δ = (D,D)
The combination of the players’ order of preference leads to an asymmetric game as
presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Asymmetric Power Relations between Israel and the Palestinians

C
Israeli
Leaders D

Palestinians
C
D
β, β
γ, α
α, δ

δ, γ

In this game, the Palestinians have a dominant strategy of non-cooperation. Israeli
leaders, on the other hand, have an order of preference in the Chicken game, meaning
they will cooperate if the Palestinians do not cooperate but will not cooperate if the
Palestinians do. If Israeli leaders recognize the Palestinians’ order of preference, they
can expect them to choose non-cooperation. Then the best possible strategy for Israeli
leaders is cooperation, leading to a unique Nash equilibrium with pure strategies (γ,α).
This equilibrium outcome expresses the asymmetry between Israeli and
Palestinian societies in terms of their willingness to tolerate the costs of a violent
conflict. Since Israeli society is less willing than Palestinian society to bear such costs,
it can be expected to achieve sub-optimal results as long as the non-cooperative game
continues and the Palestinians are willing to enter into a violent conflict. Furthermore,
this analysis implies that possible attempts by Israeli leaders to express an order of
preference in the prisoners’ dilemma rather than recognizing the weaknesses of Israeli
society may indeed lead to violent conflict, in which Israel will have no choice but to
compromise under difficult conditions. Given the asymmetric game presented in Figure
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4, the straightforward option for Israeli leaders is to influence the Palestinians’ order of
preference in such a way that violent conflict will become the worst outcome for them
as well. This means increasing the potential losses from a violent conflict by increasing
its costs, as well as increasing the benefits from cooperation – i.e., accelerating the
peace process rather than slowing it down. Alternatively, Israeli leaders may try to
create a broad consensus in Israeli society with respect to the preferred strategy,
whether a peaceful or conflictual one, toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Moreover, since the Palestinian and Israeli communities are highly integrated,
Israeli leaders can hardly use domestic obstacles to manipulate information in the
bargaining process. They can claim, as they often have, that due to these obstacles they
cannot proceed with the peace process, but the Palestinians can also see their
difficulties in creating a consensus for a militarist policy. Therefore any attempt to
manipulate information and create the impression that Israel has an order of preference
in the prisoners’ dilemma is not likely to succeed. Rather, it may trap Israeli leaders in
their own manipulation, thus creating a cognitive dissonance. On the other hand,
Palestinian negotiators successfully use internal opposition to argue that they cannot
make significant concessions. Yet if, as a result, Palestinian-Israeli relations deteriorate
to a violent conflict, Israeli leaders will have to compromise under difficult conditions
as expected by the asymmetric game presented in Figure 4.
A more complex analysis of the game in Figure 4, however, enables us to draw
practical conclusions about the preferred bargaining mechanism for Israel, as well as
possible ways to influence the attitudes of the Israeli public through this mechanism.
The game in Figure 4 describes the core of the strategic dilemma that Israel is
facing. Although the bargaining in the peace process is very complex, with many
decision points on specific issues and many issues on the table, ultimately it can be
reduced to several final decisions that will have to be made on key issues: The size and
location of territories to be under Palestinian rule, the Jerusalem problem, the refugees
problem, division of water resources, border controls, and military limitations on the
Palestinian state. We argue that given the conditions existing in the late 1990s, at each
of these crucial decision points Israel is likely to face the strategic dilemma described
in Figure 4. In other words, no matter how long the bargaining continues and whatever
tactical moves the sides make, at the final point of decision the Palestinians are likely to
adopt a conflictual approach in order to force Israel to make concessions. As long as
this game continues, Israel is likely to make these concessions.
Furthermore, given the Israel public’s unwillingness to pay the price of conflict,
dividing the peace process into many points of decision on small matters, such as the
release of three or a dozen Palestinian prisoners, creates a situation in which the public
sees a violent conflict over such points as unnecessary and therefore non-consensual
conflict. Israeli leaders therefore make the concessions. Thus, by creating many
decision points over small points, Israeli leaders actually create a situation where the
asymmetric game presented in Figure 4 is played again and again but its outcome does
not lead the Israeli public to change preferences. The concessions at each point seem
too minor to justify a conflict and thus even when the game is repeated many times, the
outcomes at one stage do not change the conditions for the next round. This cumulative
effect led Israeli Prime Minister Barak, for example, to move from a willingness to give
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the Palestinians 40% of the West Bank to a willingness to give 80-90%. This means
that breaking the peace process issues into many decision points, both in terms of subissues and in terms of time, creates a situation in which there is no difference between
the meta-game and the one-stage game. Thus, Figure 4 can describe them both.
It directly follows that Israel has strong interest in immediately reaching the final
decision points over the crucial issues in a sequential bargaining process. That is, the
best strategy for Israeli leaders is to push for a time-constrained bargaining process
seeking agreement on each crucial point individually rather than looking for a package
deal covering all the issues. Then, if concessions on an isolated crucial point are
followed by a conflictual approach by the Palestinians, the Israeli public can be
expected to see a possible conflict over the next crucial issue as a consensual one. The
model thus concludes that the bargaining mechanism should be composed of time
constrained discussions on a key issue, implementation of the agreement on it,
evaluation of the outcomes by both sides, followed then by another time constrained
discussion on a key issue, implementation, evaluation, and so on. In this way, both the
Palestinians and Israelis will have indications about the other’s intentions on the basis
of specific actions, rather than subjective interpretations and beliefs.
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown the impact of domestic processes on Israel’s
strategy toward peace during the 1990s. Such processes intensify the polarization
between different segments in Israeli society and limit the possibility that its leaders
can create a consensus for any policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict – especially a
consensus for violent conflict with the Palestinians. Since the Palestinians, as well as
other Arab countries, observe these processes, Israeli leaders can hardly use domestic
obstacles to manipulate information in the bargaining process.
Although the empirical setting analyzed in this paper is very complex, we believe
that a theoretical game approach can help make the players’ choices very clear.
Furthermore, by using games we are bounded by certain assumptions and terminology
that make the analysis clear and well founded. For example, changes in bargaining
position can be attributed to many factors. By specifying the players, their choices and
the mutual dependence between them using simple, precise language, we can point out
explanatory variables. In this respect, the two-level game analysis clearly helps explain
the complex world of international relations. We believe it is very hard to generalize
through formal models any hypothesis regarding the impact of a two-level interaction.
Rather, we demonstrated how internal polarization may create an order of preferences
in the Chicken game. Further research should proceed through a comparison of detailed
case studies.
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